Proud to be BHC

Discussion in 'Valeant Pharmaceuticals' started by anonymous, Apr 23, 2020 at 10:31 AM.

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  1. anonymous

    anonymous Guest

    Valeant has moved on to a greener Pasteur and the new name is proof of that! In the fields of observation, chance favors only the prepared mind.
     

  2. anonymous

    anonymous Guest

    Pivoting
     
  3. anonymous

    anonymous Guest

    Did you mean "Pasture" or are you that stupid?
     
  4. anonymous

    anonymous Guest

    Cut OP some slack. In Montreal where these chitbirds are headquartered, it’s actually a Pasteur to the French speakers there ok
     
  5. anonymous

    anonymous Guest

    You couldn't be more wrong! Paturage is the correct French word for Pasture in English.
     
  6. anonymous

    anonymous Guest

    Kakapo (BHC)
    These flightless parrots are absolutely adorable, but because they evolved in an area with no predators and ample food, they had no reason at all to develop their brains. Without a reason to work on a defense strategy, the kakapo has defaulted to an absolutely horrible method of defense. If you scare it, it will either hold completely still, or climb up a tree and then jump out –but since it can’t fly, it merely lands in a pathetic heap on the ground. If you don’t scare it, it very well may come out to say hi and, if it is a male, it may try to have sex with you.
     
  7. anonymous

    anonymous Guest

    So what you’re saying is that Kakapo translates to Papa in Greek, yes?
     
  8. anonymous

    anonymous Guest

    What I am saying is BHC as a whole; including the board of directors, executive management team, and many of their products and strategies (or lack thereof) share the same characteristics and or mannerisms of the Kakapo. All the negative aspects of BHC overshadow anything positive about the company. If you once again changed the name, appointed a new CEO, board of directors, and executive management team could they transform this Kakapo into a soaring Eagle? If not an Eagle, how about at least a bird that can fly? Probably not. BHC is at least three separate entities acting as one. Pick one and do it right. BHC should sell everything and file for bankruptcy.

    I think Jill did a great job describing the Kakapo and BHC (I copied and pasted her description of the bird).
     
  9. anonymous

    anonymous Guest

    YAWN!!!!
     
  10. anonymous

    anonymous Guest

    I'm YAWNING too!!! I cross out each day in a calendar with a black X. The black X represents another day that this company is AIDED to exist. I have way too many calendars with way too many Xs in them. In the mean time, what is happening here?

    Joseph C. Papa
    2019 Total Comp: $17,141,646
    2018 Total Comp: $14,741,050
    2017 Total Comp: $4,895,108

    Paul S. Herendeen
    2019 Total Comp: $6,977,361
    2018 Total Comp: $6,400,807
    2017 Total Comp: $2,597,950

    Christina M. Ackermann
    2019 Total Comp: $3,379,932
    2018 Total Comp: $3,386,907
    2017 Total Comp: $2,795,152

    Thomas J. Appio
    2019 Total Comp: $3,958,001
    2018 Total Comp: $4,386,602
    2017 Total Comp: $3,429,286

    William D. Humphries
    2019 Total Comp: $3,615,591
    2018 Total Comp: $1,374,375
    2017 Total Comp: $8,434,206
     
  11. anonymous

    anonymous Guest

    BHC's stock is up almost 5%. My black marker is running out of black stuff. Is it a sign?
     
  12. anonymous

    anonymous Guest

    those salaries of BHC executive team is not a crime.
    those salaries were approved by the board.
    i understand you're angry because your salary sux.
    you can look for another job or ask for more money
     
  13. anonymous

    anonymous Guest

    I'm obviously bored if I am reading Bausch financial statements and on CF. Being bored and posting inflated salaries (are you positive crimes weren't committed for certain aspects of those salaries?) and referencing similarities between the Kakapo and BHC, BHC's board, and BHC's executive team isn't a crime. Now what?
     
  14. anonymous

    anonymous Guest

    I am NOT positive, however, if you are accusing them of crimes for salaries where is your verifiable proof?
    I'm only on cafepharma because I have exhausted my PornHub account and my wrist hurts!
     
  15. anonymous

    anonymous Guest

    Don't lie, you're only on Cafe Pharma to read what I post. Did I accuse them of crimes? Adding more money to your pornhub account is only a few clicks away.
     
  16. anonymous

    anonymous Guest

    you initially implied their salaries were begotten by illegal means,
    then I questioned you,
    then you again implied their salaries were begotten by illegal means when you asked me if I knew they were not.

    You are a game player and a shit thrower! Go wash your hands!
     
  17. anonymous

    anonymous Guest

    I can't control how you or anyone interprets my questions. I doused my hands in alcohol just a few minutes ago. Am I playing games or are you offended? Go ahead and post something, I'll let you have the last words.
     
  18. anonymous

    anonymous Guest

    Thank you. Thank you for exposing yourself as a propagandist! Now wash behind your ears and go to bed angry little boy!
     
  19. anonymous

    anonymous Guest

    BHC is down below VRX trading levels in 1998. If you bought and help the stock 22 years ago, you are net negative. The name change means nothing. This company is a steaming pile of Enron.
     
  20. anonymous

    anonymous Guest

    Statement in Enron's 1999 Annual Report:
    In June 1999, Enron entered into a series of transactions involving
    a third party and LJM Cayman, L.P. (LJM). LJM is a private investment
    company which engages in acquiring or investing in primarily energy-
    related investments. A senior officer of Enron is the managing member
    of LJM’s general partner. The effect of the transactions was (i) Enron and
    the third party amended certain forward contracts to purchase shares of
    Enron common stock, resulting in Enron having forward contracts to
    purchase Enron common shares at the market price on that day, (ii) LJM
    received 6.8 million shares of Enron common stock subject to certain
    restrictions and (iii) Enron received a note receivable and certain finan-
    cial instruments hedging an investment held by Enron. Enron recorded
    the assets received and equity issued at estimated fair value. In connec-
    tion with the transactions, LJM agreed that the Enron officer would
    have no pecuniary interest in such Enron common shares and would be
    restricted from voting on matters related to such shares. LJM repaid the
    note receivable in December 1999.
    LJM2 Co-Investment, L.P. (LJM2) was formed in December 1999 as
    a private investment company which engages in acquiring or investing
    in primarily energy-related or communications-related businesses. In the
    fourth quarter of 1999, LJM2, which has the same general partner as
    LJM, acquired, directly or indirectly, approximately $360 million of mer-
    chant assets and investments from Enron, on which Enron recognized
    pre-tax gains of approximately $16 million. In December 1999, LJM2
    entered into an agreement to acquire Enron’s interests in an unconsoli-
    dated equity affiliate for approximately $34 million. Additionally, LJM
    acquired other assets from Enron for $11 million.
    At December 31, 1999, JEDI held approximately 12 million shares of
    Enron Corp. common stock. The value of the Enron Corp. common stock
    has been hedged. In addition, an officer of Enron has invested in the lim-
    ited partner of JEDI and from time to time acts as agent on behalf of the
    limited partner’s management.
    In 1999, Whitewing acquired approximately $192 million of mer-
    chant assets from Enron. Enron recognized no gains or losses in connec-
    tion with these transactions.
    Management believes that the terms of the transactions with relat-
    ed parties are representative of terms that would be negotiated with
    unrelated third parties.

    Statement in Enron's 2000 Annual Report: (recognized as odd / fraudulent and a catalyst that started the downward spiral)
    In 2000 and 1999, Enron entered into transactions with lim-
    ited partnerships (the Related Party) whose general partner’s
    managing member is a senior officer of Enron. The limited part-
    ners of the Related Party are unrelated to Enron. Management
    believes that the terms of the transactions with the Related Party
    were reasonable compared to those which could have been
    negotiated with unrelated third parties.
    In 2000, Enron entered into transactions with the Related
    Party to hedge certain merchant investments and other assets. As
    part of the transactions, Enron (i) contributed to newly-formed
    entities (the Entities) assets valued at approximately $1.2 billion,
    including $150 million in Enron notes payable, 3.7 million
    restricted shares of outstanding Enron common stock and the
    right to receive up to 18.0 million shares of outstanding Enron
    common stock in March 2003 (subject to certain conditions) and
    (ii) transferred to the Entities assets valued at approximately
    $309 million, including a $50 million note payable and an invest-
    ment in an entity that indirectly holds warrants convertible into
    common stock of an Enron equity method investee. In return,
    Enron received economic interests in the Entities, $309 million in
    notes receivable, of which $259 million is recorded at Enron’s
    carryover basis of zero, and a special distribution from the
    Entities in the form of $1.2 billion in notes receivable, subject to
    changes in the principal for amounts payable by Enron in con-
    nection with the execution of additional derivative instruments.
    Cash in these Entities of $172.6 million is invested in Enron
    demand notes. In addition, Enron paid $123 million to purchase
    share-settled options from the Entities on 21.7 million shares of
    Enron common stock. The Entities paid Enron $10.7 million to
    terminate the share-settled options on 14.6 million shares of
    Enron common stock outstanding. In late 2000, Enron entered
    into share-settled collar arrangements with the Entities on 15.4
    million shares of Enron common stock. Such arrangements will
    be accounted for as equity transactions when settled.
    In 2000, Enron entered into derivative transactions with the
    Entities with a combined notional amount of approximately $2.1
    billion to hedge certain merchant investments and other assets.
    Enron’s notes receivable balance was reduced by $36 million as a
    result of premiums owed on derivative transactions. Enron
    recognized revenues of approximately $500 million related to
    the subsequent change in the market value of these derivatives,
    which offset market value changes of certain merchant invest-
    ments and price risk management activities. In addition, Enron
    recognized $44.5 million and $14.1 million of interest income
    and interest expense, respectively, on the notes receivable from
    and payable to the Entities.
    In 1999, Enron entered into a series of transactions involving
    a third party and the Related Party. The effect of the transactions
    was (i) Enron and the third party amended certain forward
    contracts to purchase shares of Enron common stock, resulting in
    Enron having forward contracts to purchase Enron common
    shares at the market price on that day, (ii) the Related Party
    received 6.8 million shares of Enron common stock subject to cer-
    tain restrictions and (iii) Enron received a note receivable, which
    was repaid in December 1999, and certain financial instruments
    hedging an investment held by Enron. Enron recorded the assets
    received and equity issued at estimated fair value. In connection
    with the transactions, the Related Party agreed that the senior
    officer of Enron would have no pecuniary interest in such Enron
    common shares and would be restricted from voting on matters
    related to such shares. In 2000, Enron and the Related Party
    entered into an agreement to terminate certain financial instru-
    ments that had been entered into during 1999. In connection
    with this agreement, Enron received approximately 3.1 million
    shares of Enron common stock held by the Related Party. A put
    option, which was originally entered into in the first quarter of
    2000 and gave the Related Party the right to sell shares of Enron
    common stock to Enron at a strike price of $71.31 per share, was
    terminated under this agreement. In return, Enron paid approxi-
    mately $26.8 million to the Related Party.
    In 2000, Enron sold a portion of its dark fiber inventory
    to the Related Party in exchange for $30 million cash and a $70
    million note receivable that was subsequently repaid. Enron
    recognized gross margin of $67 million on the sale.
    In 2000, the Related Party acquired, through securitizations,
    approximately $35 million of merchant investments from Enron.
    In addition, Enron and the Related Party formed partnerships in
    which Enron contributed cash and assets and the Related Party
    contributed $17.5 million in cash. Subsequently, Enron sold a por-
    tion of its interest in the partnership through securitizations. See
    Note 3. Also, Enron contributed a put option to a trust in which
    the Related Party and Whitewing hold equity and debt interests.
    At December 31, 2000, the fair value of the put option was a $36
    million loss to Enron.
    In 1999, the Related Party acquired approximately $371 mil-
    lion of merchant assets and investments and other assets from
    Enron. Enron recognized pre-tax gains of approximately $16 mil-
    lion related to these transactions. The Related Party also entered
    into an agreement to acquire Enron’s interests in an unconsoli-
    dated equity affiliate for approximately $34 million.

    It is interesting to read Enron's 1999 and 2000 Annual Reports after knowing that fraud was committed and how it was committed. Every once in a while something will look odd and your brain clicks. Lilly's annual report for example, the net profits they realized from the revenues that they generated was incredible. I am not accusing them of fraud, it was something that I looked at several times in awe. It was probably the cost of insulin that they super-inflated, I didn't dig too deep. When trying to pick a baseball team to bet on, you compare and contrast looking for oddities that could be favorable. Reading these reports isn't much different, you compare and contrast and every once in a while maybe you spot something that looks odd. Thank you for mentioning Enron.